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In recent years we have seen the rise of a bold and fruitful approach
which attempts to explain the development of individual earnings as if they
result from a continuous choice process. A basic part of this approach is
the on—the—job training hypothesis (See Becker [1964], Mincer [1962, 1974],
Ben Porath (1967], Rosen [1972, 1973]) whereby individuals face at each point
in their lifetime, a set of options which involve the trading of current
earnings in exchange for higher future earning capacity. Given these options
the individual chooses an optimal strategy which is then reflected in his
observed earnings profile.
The basic qualitative result of this approach is that investment is
decreasing throughout life, and therefore observed earnings should increase
as long as net investment is positive. There are, however, manyadditional
aspects of lifetime earnings which can be analyzed within the investment
framework. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of changes
in exogenous parameters such as the interest rate, the length of the working
period and initial endowments on the shape of the observed earnings profile.
Though this problem can be treated in general, we shall restrict ourselves
to the following "inverse optimal" problem: find a form of the trade—off
function between current and future earnings which leads to a logarithmic earnings
function. Since such an earning function is most frequently used in econometric
research (most notably by Mincer [1974]), it is natural to inquire what restrictions
on it are implied by an optimal accumulation of human capital.
Limiting the earnings function form to the logarithmic class leads us—2--
to adopt a particular multiplicative specification for thetrade—off between
current and future earnings. Under this specification jobs areranked according
to the rate of growth in earning capacity which they offer.In this formulation
the trade—off is described by a relation' whereby a higher growthrate is
associated with a sacrifice of a higher proportion of current earnings capacity.
This specification which has been used by Blinder and Weiss [19761and Rosen
[1975], should be distinguished from the alternative additive specification:
where jobs are ranked on the basis of the absolute growth which they provide,
and costs are defined in absolute dollar terms rather than as a proportion
of earning capacity. This special case of the Ben Porath [1967]model was
analyzed in detail by Rosen [1973] Haley [1973], Lillard [1973],Wallace and
Ihnen [1975], Brown [1976], and Heckman [1975]. The additive formwhich
constrains the absolute growth in earnings does not place directrestrictions
on the behavior of log earnings over the life time.
In the paper we demonstrate that logarithmic earning functions canbe
derived from optimal behavior, Specifically, the simple case which we analyze
leads to piece wise linear log earnings functions. In contrast to "approxi-
mations" which derive logarithmic earnings functions by superimposing an
arbitrary investment profile (see Mincer [1974, pp. 80—89]and Johnson [19701).
Such a derivation has the advantage that the effects on earningsof exogenous
factors can be consistently analyzed. The model is sufficiently simple toallow
a clear exposition of the basic elements which govern earningsin a static
world. The same elements appear in the more complicated derivations currently
available in the literature but it is more difficult to trace their impact.
Finally, the multiplicative model provides additional information onthe
.—3—
robustness of the results previously derived from the Ben—Porath specification.
This is particularly important since the "production function" for human
capital is not directly observable and alternative specification can only be
compared in terms of their implications with respect to observed earnings.—4—
II. The Model
We consider an individual who operates in a static world under perfect
certainty. He is facing an investment opportunity frontier which can be
generally described as:
(1) Y=F(K,K) ,F1>OandF2<O
where Y denotes current earnings, K is the unobserved stock of human capital
(measured in efficiency units) and K is Its derivative with respect to age.
The positive partial derivative with respect to K and the negative partial
derivative with respect to K, reflect the trade—off between current and future
earnings which Is implicit In an equilibrium wage structure.
An additive specification of the trade—off function is:
(2) YRK— c(K)
where R is the "rental rate" on human capital. (Without loss of generality
we shall subsequently assume R=l.) This form arises, for Instance in the Ben—
Porath model when the depreciation rate on human capital is assumed to be zero.
The simplifying feature of this specification is that dollar investment costs
are independent of the earnings capacity of the Individual.
The multiplicative specification is:
(3) Y =KG()
.—5—
where K is earnings capacity, is its rate of change, and G() is the pro-
portion of earnings capacity used to generate current earningsl—G() is the
proportion sacrificed), associated with each rate of growth. Notethat we
ignore the direct costs of training and assume that all costs are opportunity
costs. The simplifying aspect of this specification is that"time" costs,
i.e. the proportion of earning capacity which is sacrificed, depend only on
the rate of growth in human capital and not on the level of accumulatedstock.
The trade—off function G() is best described within the framework of
activity analysis, (See Rosen [1972]). One option which is open tothe
individual is full—time schooling. Let us denote the rate of growth which is
obtained in this case by a—S where S is the depreciation rate. For this option
the individual has to give up all his earnings, i.e. G(a—5) =0.The job
market also offers training opportunities. It is convenient to use an index
x to rank the growth options associated with the various jobs ascompared to
the growth which can be obtained at schools. Thus, x runs between 0 and 1,
x =1characterizes the school activity, x =0corresponds to the job in
which =—S,that is no investment is performed. It is natural to
assume that G(—cS) =1,i.e., no sacrifice of current earnings is necessary
in this case.In Figure 1, we present the various options, assuming
no mixtures of activities.The line ab' describes the options in the
job market. Its negative slope indicates that in an equilibrium wage
structure, jobs with better growth options are not provided freely.
The point b describes the schooling option. If it isfeasible to purchase
linear mixtures of jobs or of schooling and jobs by an appropriatealloca-
tion of time, then the efficient frontier is the line acb.We shall denote
this frontier by g(x). The point c is determined by thecondition—6—
.













where f(x) is the trade—off in the job market.
Notice our implicit assumption in describing the set of training options.
We assume that a higher rate of growth can be achieved at school than in the
job market if one is willing to give up all his current earning. On the
other hand, pure on—the—job training is more efficient than full—time or
part—time schooling if low levels of growth are desired, i.e. x < x0. This
specification is designed to capture, among other things, the discontinuity
in investment In human capital which seems to occur upon leaving school,
See Mincer [1974, p 94]).
We assume a perfect capital market and ignore the choice of leisure. The
objective of each individual is to maximize the present value of his life time
earnings. The maximization problem is thus:
T
(5) Max J Kg(x)dT
{x}
s.t ax — 0x 1 ,K(O)=
1(0
The length of life is denoted by T, and r is the exogenously given rate of
interest. Using the Hamiltonian function, the above can be transformed into
the following maximization problem:
(6) Max eT K[g(x) + p(ax—5)]
O x 1
with b =r-g(x)-(ax-) , (T)=0—8—
.
Thismaximization problem is easy to interpret. The returns from human
capital, (in the form of "full" wages per unit of capital) depend on the
amount of investment. The "full" wage consists of the observed current wages,




denotes the marginal returns of the investment activity. Note that at each
point of time these benefits are equal to the present value of future optimal
"full" rates of returns. The optimal path is such that for any given shadow
price, p,theindividual chooses the level of investment which maximizes the
full wage.
The optimal path of investment can be presented graphically as a movement
along the investment frontier g(x), which is associated with the changing shadow
price for investment.As long as a >—g'(x0) the individual will specialize in
schooling (x =1).If ai =—g'(x0),
the individual will be indifferent among
the various allocations of time between school and work at the job x0. For
—g' (0) <ap<—g'(x0) the individual will choose a tangency point in which
a =—g'(x).Finally, if a4i <-g'(O)there will be no investment and the job
with maximal current earning will be chosen.
Since we are interested, in this paper, in a model which is solvable
in a closed form, we proceed by specifying a functional form for the
investment frontier.
Suppose that the opportunity set for pure on—the—job training, f(x), is
given by:
.—9--
(8) =[1— (+ a >> 0 0 <a<1
a <
Theparametercan be interpreted as the efficiency of producing human
capital on the jobs Higher values ofimply that for a given growth rate a
higher proportion of earning capacity is retained. The assumption that<a
means that even if all earning capacity is given up, the rate of growth
which is attained by pure on—the—job training will be less than that which can
be achieved in school. In the same vein 'a' can be Interpreted as the effi-
ciency of producing human capital in school. Higher values of 'a' mean that
upon giving up all earning capacity and choosing the schooling activity higher
growth is attained. Finally, a is a parameter which governs the concavity of
the opportunity set; we assume that 0 <a<1.The condition a </aguarantees
that for small levels of investment on—the—job training is more efficient.
Using the definition x =--( +6) we obtain the following specification
for g(x).
F
(1—- x)a for x x0
g(x) =
a a a a a—i
(1 —- x0)
—a-(1—- x0) (x—x0)for lx
wherex =a ,a>anda< 0 1—a a
This particular form leads to an extremely simple optimal pattern for
the observed net earnings. The rate of growth of earnings is piece—wise
constant. Productive life is thus divided into three phases: a schooling—10—
. phasein which no earnings are observed, an investment period in which observed
earnings are positive and grow at a constant rate, and a non—investment period
in which earnings decline at a constant rate. The length of each phase, as
well as the slope of the earnings and investment profiles in each phase can
be related to the basic parameters which the individual faces.
These solutions are: (See appendix for derivations)
(10) T1 T+ —-ln(l—
(r+6))
l—cz





(13) ( ÷8y for t0￿T< y 1—cz
1° forTlT<T
where Y denotes observed earnings andy == g(x)is the proportionof
earnings capacity used in the tprod ti of earnings and l—y is the
proportion invested. Even though these activities areperformed jointly
on the job one may think of y as the "proportion of time"spent in pro-
ducing goods, and 1—y as the proportion of timespent in producing new
knowledge. (see Mincer 11974, p. 19])
The boundary conditions for this system are:
S—11—




where Y(T0) can be interpreted as observed starting salaries and is
the exogenously given initial level of human capital.
As seen from the above set of equations there are some restrictions
on the parameters which are implicit in a life time earnings profile which
includes all three phases. The basic condition is:
(16) a >r+5 which implies >(r+S)
The interpretation of these two conditions is quite transparent; for posi-
tive investment to exist, it is necessary that the returns from investment
exceed the costs associated with the postponement of earnings.
As suggested by Becker [1964, pp. 14—151 and Ben—Porath [1967], one
may explain the general shape of the earnings profile in an
investment framework. In particular the positive slope during the on—the—
job investment period reflects positive and decreasing investment on the
job)' The concavity of the log earnings profile depends, however, on the
specific trade—off function g(x). The specific form (9) which we adopted has
the property thatincreases with age as y increases. The degree of convex-
ity in y (concavity in investment time) is just sufficient to offset the reduc-
tion in as investment decreases.—12—
The comparative statics of the model are also extremely simple. Con-
sider first a change in the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate
will tend to reduce the slope of the log earnings profile. (See figure 2.)
This is directly evident from equation (12). It can be seen from equatlon (10)
that the length of the no investment period, T —r1,willincrease; that is,
the peak in earnings will be attained at an earlier age. Since y(To) and
yt1) are both independent of r and since y is decreasing with r for
every y, the individual will stay a longer period In the region of on—the—job
investment. It follows that'r0 must decrease, i.e., the individual will
invest less in schooling. A similar result can be derived for the additive
formulation (2). The only difference is that the increase in the interest rate
reduces the absolute growth in earnings rather than Its rate of growth.
Consider next the issue of differences in ability. One measure of
increased ability is an increase in earning capacity which is uniform and
independent of the (endogenous) level of skill. Differences in the initial
stock of human capital will induce parallel shifts in logarithmic earnings
function without any further effect on the length of the various investment
periods. (This result is in contrast to that of the additive Ben—Porath model
where increase in leads to a shorter time span in school. See Haley [1973].)
An alternative specification is to associate increase in ability with an
increase in the efficiency of "producing" human capital as represented by the
parameters a and .Ifa person is a better student at school (higher a)
the effect will be higher y0, while and t1remainthe same. It is easy to
show that rçj must go up. In other words, there will be a longer period in
school with a lower investment on the job once out of school. The log earn-
ings profile will shift in a parallel fashion with the peak remaining unchanged.—13—




If a person is a better on—the—job student (higher )willincrease while
y0 will decrease. The effect on r1is positive and on T0 negative. In other
words, this individual will invest less In schooling and more in on—the—job
training. The log earnings profile will have a higher slope, and will peak
at a later age.
The most realistic case seems to be that in which both a and increase.
The effect on the length of the schooling period is ambiguous in this case.
An interesting special case is that in which the optimal level of schooling,
T0 ,remainsthe same. The implication of higher ability will be a higher log
earnings profile with a higher slope and a later peak. Another special case
is that in which a and grow at the same rate so that y0, the initial
investment in on—the—job training, remains the same. In this case, higher
ability will lead to more schooling, and the log earnings profile will have a
higher slope and a later peak.
An important empirical phenomenon is the existence of considerable
variation in the atwhich a given level of schooling is obtained. To
a large extent, postponement may result from many factors not incorporated
in the present analysis, such as imperfections in the capital market, differ-
ences in preferences towards leisure, and uncertainty with respect to one's
own abilities and preferences. Within our simple model, we can, however,
deal with the effects of exogenous changes in the age of entry, due to, say,
military service. A person who is a late starter (See Johnson and Stafford
[1974]) will have a shorter horizon, and naturally will tend to invest less.
If there is a positive period of specialization, the reduction in investment
will take the form of a shorter schooling period. The log earning profile
will be lower but Its slope will remain the same. The age of entry and peak—15—
in earning will be unaffected. This is a somewhat unrealistic result
which follows from the assumption that the age of retirement is exogenous. A
perhaps more realistic assumption is that for brief postponements the length
of the working period is constant (See Mincer [1974, p. 10—11]).
Finally, consider the effects of a disruption in the accumulation of
experience, that is, exogenous changes in participation.
If a woman, say, plans to stay out of the labor force for some interval
[T',T"] her profile will be as depicted In Figure 3. Note thatupon returning
to the labor force her earnings are somewhat lower reflecting the effects
of depreciation. If the disruption is expected, thewoman will also plan
under a shorter horizon and therefore her specialization period will be
shorter and the level of earning will be lower forevery level of work experience.
This horizon effect will be absent if the break Is unexpected, but otherwisethe
results will be identical. This is a directconsequence of the independence
between the investment rate and the level of human capital inour model. Notice
that when log earning is plotted against experience, rather thanage, the out-
come is a flatter log earnings profile.—16—
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The simple model just described has several important implications
for empirical research.
1. Since in a static world schooling and investment on the job are governed
by the same basic exogenous factors, individual differences in schooling
are associated with corresponding differences in the slope of the earnings
function. For instance, if the main source of individual variation is due
to differences in the interest rate, we would observe a positive interaction
between the level of schooling and the growth of earnings. (For some evidence
on this point see Weiss and Lillard [1976].)
2. Log earnings profiles when estimated from either cross section (see
Mincer [l974])or longitudinal data (see Weiss and Lillard [1976]) tend to
be concave in age (or experience). That is, the rate of growth in earnings
appears to decline smoothly with age. As our simple model illustrates, this
is not a general property of earnings profiles which arise from optimal
accumulation of human capital. It is quite easy, however, to introduce
concavity into the multiplicative model. One may either add age effect
explicitly (see Weiss and Lillard [1967]) or choose an alternative form-
ulation of the trade—off function2. (See Rosen [1975], Weiss [1974].)
3. The observed earnings of an individual at different points in time are
systematically related through his choice of investment program. In fact,
in the absence of exogenous shocks we can predict the earnings of an individual
from a sample of his past earnings without having any additional information—18—
. abouthim. All the relevant information on his schooling, his ability and
his access to the capital market is already incorporated in the past level
and growth of his earnings. The particular form of the autoregressive scheme
which emerges depends critically on the form of the trade off function (1).
If one assumes that simple multiplicative form (3) then annual observations
on this continuous process should approximately satisfy:
(17) lnY =lnY1
+ constant
Analogous formulations can be derived for the additive case, if it is further
assumed that C(K) is quadratic. Such a specification implies a second order
linear differential equation in earnings (see Rosen [1973]) and discrete
observations would approximately satisfy the autoregressive scheme:
(18) =aY1+ bY2 + constant
Higher order linear schemes arise if one allows the trade—off function
F( )tobe a general quadratic. An interesting aspect of these schemes is
the alternatings signs of the coefficients on past earnings (see Weiss [1974]).
Autoregressive schemes can be applied to longitudinal data and yield estimates
for some of the parameters. The rate of interest, for instance, can be directly
estimated from (18). Furthermore they can be used to differentiate between
alternative specifications of the trade—off function. A sharper discrimination
can sometimes be made when the models are compared in terms of the autoregressive—19—
schemes which they imply rather than the explicit age profiles (which
frequently become complicated nonlinear functions).
4. The breaks in participation which characterize the work career of many
women lead to flatter log earning profiles, when viewed as a function of
experience.(For empirical evidence see Johnson and Stafford [19741,
Polachek and Mincer [1976]). It is important to note that this result
is independent of possible discrimination against women in the labor
force. If, for instance, the rental rate for human capital of females is
half that of males their investment pattern will be unaffected. As long
as opportunity costs in the market are the sole costs of training, such
discrimination would affect the benefits and costs of training equally. In
the present context discrimination can lead to flatter profiles for women
only if it is increasing with the level of skill.
5. It is sometimes argued that short work horizons are likely to
lead to flatter earnings profiles. This had been suggested by
Johnson and Stafford [1974a and l974b] as an explanation of flatter profiles
of women and "late starters't. As we have seen this need not be the case.
In our simple model the reduction in investment of individuals with relatively
short horizon takes the form of reduced schooling rather than a lower rate of
investment in on—the—job training. Consequently, the level of earnings is
affected but not its rate of growth. In fact, if the comparison holds
schooling constant, those with shorter horizons probably face a lower rate of
interest or are of higher learning ability, therefore their earning profile
may well have a higher slope. It is worth noting, however, that if age effects
are introduced explicitly (see Lillard and Weiss [1976]) late starters do
tend to have a flatter profile, but this reflects the effects of age on the
capacity to learn rather than the shorter horizon effect.—20--
Footnotes
1. It is possible that there exists an automatic process of learning
from experience which is to some extent independent of individual decisions
(that is, g(x) approaches 1 at a positive( + 6). In such a context, the
theory only explains differences in the slope of the earnings profiles in
terms of differential investment. It is clearly riot necessary to assume
positive investment for the purpose of explaining a positive slope of the
earnings profile.
2. The relation between the form of g(x) and the concavity of the
log earning profile during the investment period Is given by:
z =[x]F(x)
where zlnYand
F(x) =2•&—ggg12 g gg g
When g(x) =(1—- x),then F(x) =0for all x.
For any function g(x) such that g >0,g' <0,g" <0,a sufficient
condition for F(x) <0and thus <0is that g" 0.
For a detailed discussion of the case in which g"' =0,see Rosen [1975].
Needless to say, under our specification g" <0.
.—21—
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The purpose of this appendix is to derive equations 10 to 13 in the
text and to prove some comparative statics results.
The problem which we solve is the maximization of (6) subject to (9)
in the text.
The necessary conditions for optimum are:
(Al) g'(x) + a >0if x0 >x<1
g'(x) + a <0if x =0
g'(x) +ai=0if 0< x <x0
and
(A2) p =(r+S)—ijax—g(x) p(T) =0
In the case of an interior solu_ion we can take the derivative of the
first order condition with respect to age to obtain a differential equation
for x.
(A3) = [r+51 — [—g(x) a
The rate of increase in observed earning is given by
(A4)=+g'(X)=ax-+g'(±)
YKg(x) g(x)
and substituting for x we obtain—24--
(A5) =ax-6+g'(x)'[r+ 6]
—g'(x)g'(x) [—g(x) + xg'(x)1
g(x) g"(x) g'(x)
a
Under the special functional form (9):
(A6) [g'(x)]2=ctand—g(x) + xg'(x)= +x(a—l)
g(x)g"(X) ct—i g'(x) cta
hence
(A7) = —6 + (—r—6)
which is equation (12) in the text.
We can also determine the length of each of the phases in the individual
investment program. During the last phase of zero investment we have:
1 —(r+6)(T—t) (A8) p= (r+6)ip—l and 1(T)=--- 1—e ]
theageof the peak in earnings is determined by the condition:
(A9) p(i1)—g'(O)= (1—e+6)CT_Ti))
or
(AlO) T—T1=—-- mCi — (r+6)I)
.—25—
To determine the length of the investment on the job phase, we have to solve
equation 13 in the text and use the boundary conditions in equation 14.
Define q =y=1—x,thenequation i3in the text can be rewritten
as:
(All) q =Aq+ Bq2 where A = andB =
withthe solution:
(A12) T—T0 in Tq —in
A+Bq0
I
usingthe boundary conditions we obtain:
(Al3) T1—T0 =
[ln(A+B)+ in(0) ].
Theschooling (or specialization period) is then found as a residual
using the identity:
(A14) T0 =T—(T—T1)—(T1—T0)
Equation Ai4 can be also used to derive an explicit solution for the invest-





Weconclude with a brief discussion of comparative statics. Theeffect






Todetermine the effect of 8, let us rewrite equation (9) as:
A+Bq0 T —
A11A+B)q01
+ ln(l— r+5 B
___ aa whereA =8—r—6 B =8/a, q0 -j--—(.-—1). 1—a
a—r—5
is independent of 8.Wethus have: Note that A + Bq0 =
_____ 11dA dB 1 dq0 1 dB (A17) — = __________ -4 ln(—)+ ( ( + -)+ +
B2-(r+6)B •




Due to the concavity of the log function,





A2(1—cz) (A+B)q0— jj (l—q0)]
<
.—27—




s.t. =ax—, 0< x < 1 ,K(T)=
1(3
WhereTis the age of entry. Upon a change of variables,=T—T
the problem becomes Identical to the discussedpreviously except that T
Is replaced by T—T.Itis seen that the length of time spent in the last
two phases is unaffected. It follows from (A14) that the period of timespent
in school must decrease.
The effects of an expected interruption in career can beanalyzed by









when 1i(t) =1the solution is identical to the one derivedpreviously. On
the other hand =— whenh(r) =0.Therefore during periods of participation
the rate of growth in Y Is the same, theonly effect is on the initial Y at
each phase.—28—
Appendix B
The purpose of this appendix is to derive the autoregressive schemes
in earnings for the linear and multiplicative specifications of the invest-
ment frontier. It reproduces the main results of my "Notes on Income
Generating Functions," (Princeton 1974).
Consider first a model which leads to a linear earnings generating
function of the f0rm.
Bi. =1t_1+ a2Yt2
+
where denotes annual observed earnings) or in continuous
time formulation
B2. Y. =cY. +
1 li—i 2i—2
where Y. denotes the i'th order derivative with respect to time
1 .
RosenfIcrL3] has considered some special cases of this form.
Let us write the individual's maximization problem as
T—rt B3. MAX Ie
F(K,K1)dt.
Kt to
where K is the amount of human capital and K1 is its rate of
change. We may assume FK >0,and <0.
1
The optimal accumulation path satisfies the Euler condition:
—rt d—rt . B4.e FK--





+ K1 + FKK K2
A necessary and sufficient condition for a linear autoregressive
S29—
scheme for observed earnings is that the observed (net) earning
function Y =F(K,K1)iS Quadratic in K and. K1 Eauation-B2 then
becomes a second order linear equation.
B5. K2 =Ao +AK + X2K1
We can now derive a differential equation in Y. Note that if F is
quadratic then Y is a linear function in K K2
K1, K, KK1. Using
condition (B5), we can write Y1 as a function of thesame variables
similarly for Y2, Y3,etc.We thus have a linear system of equations
B6.Z =AXwhere Z = X=[K
/K2
/K




element row vector of the matrix A. is given
function. B is the matrix.



























. IfA is of full rank, we solveY5—b5 =a135AXand get a fifth order
linear differential equation. However A is in general not of full rank














B -A whereA =r A A








(theoptiniality condition is rewritten in this case as I =—+ AI
where I =K+6K).









where A =-+ 6(r+6) 1a
A2 =r
It is possible that due to transaction costs adjustment is not
smooth anddecisionsarerevised onlyon a set of discrete points.
To provide the discrete analogue of the problem let us subdivide the—31—
interval (o,T) into equal subintervals by introducing the points
t ,t,, ... twhere t =0,t =Tand t. —t.=ttis the time o12 n 0 n i i—i
interval.The function K(t) is assumed to remain fixed in each such
interval, and we have the correspondence t =t,t,t...tand 012 n
K =
K0,K1, K2 .. .K.The objective function can be rewrittenas
K1, K2.. .K
=E(1+rat)'F(K.1,Ki_Ki_l)t
The first order conditions are given by




Dividing through 'by t and allowing it to approach zero we get
the Euler condition [B4'} as urn\j1.For finite differences,
tt-0 t
eg t =1,we get due to the assumption that F is quadratic, that:
=
F(Kt,Kt_i)
= + + ai3Kt_1+ +
a15KtKti. In
this analysis we shall restrict ourselves to the case
cz,=O.
The optimality condition assumes the form:












B9'. =(1-6+ + (l+r)2) -(1+r)+l+r+t-2
+(1-6)(±L)3y —A2 (1-6-r + - 2
2a(1—6
BlO'. = ++ 2X)Y1




——n] andA2 =1+ r
The parameters cl2, 14' 15 are the coefficients in the earnings
function of K, K1, and Kt Kti respectively.
The sign pattern of the coefficients is somewhat surprising. In
the simplest case 7',thepartial effect of "_2 holding Yti constant
is negative. This is equivalent to a positive (explosive) relation
betweenY+i andYt. Indeed equation 7'canbe rewritten as
=(1+r)2lY_1 —a— (2+r)
More generally we notice that at least some lagged values appear with a
negative coefficient. One hesitatesto interpret these a partial
derivatives, since all income levels are determined endogenously and
simultaneously.
Consider now the multiplicative model and let F(K,K') =f(K)g(x)where
x = (+6) and f(K) is assumed to be of constant elasticity, I.e.
f(K) =AK O<<l—33—
The Euler condition assumes the form
Bil. = +a
g (x) g (x)
Let us denoteZ =logY,then
B12. Z =(ax- +g'(X)
Using equation Bil the change in log earnings, Z, can be written as
a function of x, e.g. Z =R(x).IfR is a monotone function of X we
can solve x= i'(z). Finally Z =R'(X)Xis also a function of X
Under the invertibility assumption it follows that a second order
differential equation exists such that
B13. z =
Thisagain is an autoregressive scheme, but in terms of log earnings.
The particular form of the function a(Z) will, of course, depend on
the choice of g(x).
We have already considered the degenerate case in which g(x) =(l—x)
and R(x) =constant.We have seen that this form leads to a linear log
earnings profile during the phase of on—the—job investment.
A relatively simple form, which leads to a concave log earnings
profile is g(x) =(l—x)(1+x)=1-x2.In this case
B14. x =(r+85)x—l+x2)
< 0
B15.Z =— Bô+ax —2x2(r+)2 >Oforlargex




(we assume that a > r + 5, note that > 2 for xL0,lJ)—34—
. Zis monotone increasing in s, in the relevantrange. We can
solve for x in terms of Z. The resulting relationbetween Z and
Z is, however, not particularly attractive.
A form of g(x) hich is somhat more tractableis a combination
of the two previous cases in which g(x) is thepositive portion of
the unit circle. That is g(x) =(l_2)½.In this case
Bl7. x =(l—x2)(r-s-85)x—8a)<0
2 <Oforsmaflx B18. Z =2ax——x(r+)
>0for large x
B19. Z -2(a -r(8+)x)2(1—)< 0
Finally the autoregressive scheme assumes the form _
2
B20. Z =-2[(Ba)2 -
2(8a)+(+z)() + 2(a)2-(r+))
-(z+)2-2 {(a)2 -
2. The coefficient of $+6Z is negative, that of (Z+)isosjtive.
To summarize, it is easy to find simple go functionwhich yield
an earnings profile which is concave in the logs. These forms,however,
in general do not lead to a simple autoregressivescheme. In practice
a quadratic approximation Z =a+8Z+ maybe advisable.
.